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him to go to the place not originally covered by his invitation. However, if he wanders to a place where he had
never been before or clearly had no right to go, then it
seems more likely he will be classified a licensee or perhaps
even a trespasser. This question of status on implied invitation or custom will remain in doubt until a clearer view
is taken by the Court.
ALLAN

B. BLUMBERG

Amended Definition Of Sale To Include
Food Consumed On Premises
Effective June 1, 1958, a new definition of the word sale
was added to the Maryland Uniform Sales Act:
"'Sale' includes a bargain and sale as well as a sale
and delivery and also the serving or providing of food
for human consumption by any caterer,or by any restaurant, hotel, boarding house, dining room or any
other eating establishment."'
The effect of this addition will, it would clearly seem,
result in bringing food purchased in a restaurant for immediate consumption under the definition of an implied
warranty.
Prior to this change in the statute, the only case presenting the question of whether food purchased in a restaurant
was a sale or a service was Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler.2
There, the plaintiff entered the defendant's restaurant and
ordered a sandwich. When she bit into the bread, a piece of
tin lodged in her mouth causing serious injury. The Court,
in reversing judgment for the plaintiff, concluded that the
purchase and eating of food on the premises was not a sale
within the meaning of the Sales Act.' The feeling was
expressed that if a sale were found, and therefore an im17 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1958), Art. 83, §94(1). It should be noted that
this is an amendment to the Uniform Sales Act in Maryland by the Maryland General Assembly, and not one promulgated by the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws. The portion added at the end is italicized.
173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105 (1938), noted, 2 Md. L. Rev. 277 (1938).
8
Ibid., 503. The Court there said:
"We hold that an action in tort in such cases as this affords to the
Injured person a convenient and adequate remedy, and disposes of the
contention that the adoption of the negligence theory, rather than that
of an implied warranty, would amount to a practical denial to those
injured in cases from food adulteration, foreign substances or unmerchantable quality."
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plied warranty as to fitness for consumption, the restaurant
keeper would be in the position of an insurer. By finding
that food served on the premises was only a service, the
burden was put on the injured party to show negligence on
the part of the restaurant keeper since the action would be
in tort and not in contract. Two judges dissented on the
grounds that a restaurant keeper who serves food is very
well aware of the use to which it will be put and therefore
this type of transaction should be treated as a sale and
subject to any implied warranties that are applicable.4
The Maryland Court has made the distinction between
food purchased in a restaurant and food purchased in a
retail store for consumption at some other place. In Vaccarino v. Cozzubo,5 the Court, while finding the plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence, still held that sale of
food by a retail store for immediate consumption is a sale
and not a service, and therefore subject to implied warranties.
Prior to the passage of the amendment to the Sales
Act,6 Maryland was in the minority regarding retail restaurant service.
"The numerical minority of the jurisdictions in
which the question has arisen adhere to the view that
one engaged in the business of serving food for immediate consumption on the premises does not impliedly warrant that the food served is wholesome or
fit for human consumption but, in the absence
'7 of an
express statute, is liable only for negligence.
It is interesting to note that the recent Maryland amendment does not specifically mention drink.' Whether the
omission of this word by the legislature was intentional
or not we do not know. However, on the face of the language of the amendment it might appear that anyone
Ibid., 516:
"To say that a restaurant keeper who delivers a sandwich, or some
other similar portion of food, to a patron who pays for it, when the
restaurant keeper knows that the purchaser intends to eat it, makes no
representation that it is fit to eat, if it is to be eaten in the restaurant,
but does make such a representation if it is to be taken out of the
restaurant, seems absurd."
181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943), noted 8 Md. L. Rev. 61 (1943). And
see 18 Md. L. Rev. 156 (1958).
0 Supra, n. 1.
7 A. L. R. 2d 1027, 1054, 1055, citing the Swingler case, supra,n.2.
"The Proposed Uniform Cpmmercial Code (1957 Official Text) provides
in §2-314 that the "serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either
on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." (Italics supplied.)

19581

KEITZ v. NATIONAL PAVING CO.

injured by a deleterious substance in a drink will still have
to base his suit on negligence and not on implied warranty.
On the other hand, it could be argued that beverages for
human consumption are just as much food as are solids, and
this would seem to be the more reasonable interpretation.
There is some doubt as to what effect the new provision will make in the practical application of the rule.
Whether or not the new law will give rise to a series of
nuisance claims remains to be seen. In any event, it seems
sound to give relief to one injured in a restaurant on the
same grounds as if food were taken out. The difficulty,
even impossibility, of proving negligence in many cases
can result in injustice.
ALLAN

B.

BLUMBERG

The Borrowed Servant
Keitz v. National Paving and ContractingCompany'
Lloyd Ogle was driving a dump truck on Pimlico Road
when he negligently drove across the center line and struck
a bus, seriously injuring the driver. A suit was instituted
against the servant Ogle, and against Elizabeth May Sudbrook and The National Paving Company, who were, respectively, his general and special employers.2 The lower
court directed a verdict in favor of the special employer,
and the jury found against the other two defendants. The
plaintiff appealed, seeking to hold the special employer also.
The Court of Appeals awarded plaintiff a new trial against
National. In deciding that the jury could reasonably find
that National had such a relationship to Ogle's acts that it,
as well as Sudbrook, could be held liable, the Court pointed
out that it is essential that a master who is to be held have
the right to control, but not that he actually exercise it.
Under the usual test, when the servant causes injury
by doing an act in a negligent manner, that master is held
1214 Md. 479, 134 A. 2d 296 (1957).
Md. 496, 136 A. 2d 299.

Reargued on different points, 214

2The general employer is that individual with whom the servant is
regularly employed and who was the master before the servant was bor-

rowed or hired and who will continue as such after the service to the
special employer has terminated. The special employer is that individual
who has borrowed or hired the servant from the general employer. There
is generally a contractual relationship between the general and special employers under which the servant is lent or hired to the special employer.
For an illustration of this definition see: M.EHF , AGENoY (4th ed.
1952) §453.

